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Radically new technology offers the prospect of a New and high productivity Economy for  the industrially 
advanced economies. These opportunities are rapidly taken advantage of by innovative firms operating across 
national borders. Rapid globalization, therefore, makes the regional dimension of economic growth increasingly 
overshadow the national dimension. Economic transformation, furthermore, is also being pushed by a still 
ongoing (2003) severe recession , forcing previously successful firms to shed resources and making industrial 
assets available in the market at depressed prices. Technologies embodied in those assets are often globally 
mobile. Even large regions or nations , however, may lack a sufficiently broad  commercialization competence 
to locally identify, capture and industrialize all  free floating technologies. Hence,  also  previously prosperous  
regions may risk missing the boat to the New Economy , and history is full of such regional failures . Therefore, 
even large regional economies will depend on foreign investors, and  policy authorities in many industrial 
regions have initiated  policy races both to attract new resources  and to shore up the outward flow  that might 
otherwise occur through the intermediation of global companies. 
The outcome of all this may be the creation of other concentrations of excellence among the rich industrial 
economies than those created in the wake of the previous industrial revolution some 150 years ago.      
Being attractive for advanced investments is synonymous to being both internationally competitive and offering 
a rich supply of complementary industrial  services to potential investors. The local capacity ( receiver 
competence)   to identify and locally commercialize technological spillovers is always more narrow than the 
supplies of technology. Competence bloc theory is used to explain and  characterize the locally attractive 
attributes and to demonstrate how they can be  enhanced through policy to attract global resources.The Lake 
Mälar/Baltic region in Sweden  is used to clarify how policy action may stem the outward flow by making the 
region attractive  for imports of industrial competence and  inward investment emphasizing the need to import 
industrially competent  venture capital to broaden the local receiver competence and  to support local new firm 
establishement based on locally available  technology . The  Bavaria/Baden- Württemberg (B/W-W) region in 
Southern Germany is used to  illustrate the opposite, namely a region that may possess the broad based capacity 
to locally reinvest in  locally released technologies.   
For Sweden this amounts to a repeat of the 17
th and 18
th century industrial policy of Swedish kings to stimulate 
the foreign immigration of skilled labor, only that this time the purpose is to build new industry for economic 
growth,  not to build an imperial war machine. The dramatic restructuring over markets in Sweden holds the 
promise, if succesful, to be more innovative than the B/B-W restructuring, but the Swedish case is   more risky , 
not least because of a political unwillingness to introduce the necessary institutional reforms .  
 
Key words: Competence Bloc theory, Experimentally Organized Economy, Globalization, New Economy, 
Policy Competition, Regional Industrial Attractor, Social Capital, Venture Capital Competence  





   2
1.  The Nature of Radical Industrial Reorganization – the race for a New 
Economy 
 
The industrial world is in the midst of a four dimensional transition: (1) New technology is 
being rapidly introduced  and redefining the competitive situation between incumbent firms 
and potential new entrants. We may talk about entering a New Economy. (2) The same 
technology is supporting a rapid globalization of production redefining  the geographical 
distribution of production among industrial economies. (3) This globalization  is undermining  
the economic base of national economies as autonomous  policy makers, but new regional 
allocations of industrial excellence are being created instead, often transcending national 
borders (Eliasson 2003a).This (4) geographical reallocation of resources has been occurring  
in the midst of the perhaps most  disrupting  recession since the 1930s, shaking resources 
loose in the market, making players  cautious and myopic and  raising the incidence of long 
term business mistakes (Eliasson 2002e). It has become important for the local economy to 
keep the freely floating technologies reinvested locally. Since the local supply of 
commercialization competence rarely is sufficient, it has been considered necessary in many 
regions and countries  to attract complementary foreign investors. We have seen policy 
competition for FDI develop. Such policy competition  is, however, competence demanding. 
Many regions will fail and a case for diversity in long- term regional growth can be argued. 
Local  attractiveness depends on the local institutions that define economic incentives, orient 
competition and  enforce the property rights needed to reduce uncertainty and ensure 
tradability in intangible knowledge assets. An important part of these institutions will, of 
course, be  the national legal framework and national policies   that may , nevertheless, be 
overshadowed by more informal regional  attributes, and not least, the local availability of 
competent labor. The complexity facing the policy maker is as large as that facing the 
business decision maker. Hence, beauty contests to attract global resources are  currently 
being played out in many theaters of the industrial world and the situation is such  that both 
business actors and regional policy makers are likely to make  serious decision mistakes, a 
lottery outcome that will only add to  regional diversity. 
I discuss  theoretically how a   regional beauty contest should be designed to support long- 
term growth in terms of the theory of the Experimentally Organized Economy (EOE) and of 
Competence Blocs. In that analysis the supply of  industrially competent  venture capital 
services will be found to be particularly important. Two regions have been chosen for special 
study, because they exhibit  similar industrial competence configurations. The Lake 
Mälar/Baltic  and the Bavaria/Baden- Württemberg regions both feature the same three 
industries; a) Biotech/Pharmaceuticals/Health care, b) Computing & Communications (C&C) 
industry, notably mobile telecom, and c) engineering industry . Each industry in each region 
holds  large international players of current and /or past global excellence. The Lake 
Mälar/Stockholm/Baltic region, also has a fairly - by continental European standards  - 
sophisticated financial services industry  with some links to London. Southern Germany is 
close to Frankfurt and the financial center of Germany, and Munich is said to be the venture 
capital centre of Germany. A broad base of industrially competent venture capitalists is   
needed to finance a transition from the old mature, to  radically new industrial structures. 
Both the Lake Mälar region and Southern Germany are, however, disadvantaged on the 
financial score compared to the US, notably the US west coast which has the world´s most 
sophisticated venture capital industry (Eliasson 1997b). In addition, the weak, in these 
regions, industrial competence base of the actors in the financial services industry explains a 
strong underlying current (at least  in the Lake Mälar region) of moving sophisticated  and   3
radically new  industrial and CHQ related financial activities to London and even further 
away to the US (Eliasson 2001c). This dynamic is interesting and the outcome difficult to 
predict.   
 
2. Why is Regional Development Overshadowing National Economic Progress?  
 
National boundaries are historical and have been set for other reasons than to establish 
economically efficient production systems. The main reason for forming the EU was also 
political even though economic integration was a means to achieve political objectives. And  
the enlarged trading area with a fairly common rule system, and, eventually, a common 
monetary system,  offer industrial opportunities that none of the member countries could 
create individually, many of them offering maximum economic potential only from 
integration across national borders.This , of course, requires that  national policy makers 
focus their attention, and accept the negative sides of regional adjustment and diversity.  
The economic regions of a national economy have also been historically determined, being 
distinguished from each other by urban concentrations. The Lake Mälar economy in Sweden 
has an industrial and trading history dating back to the early Viking age. It evolved into 
modern times by way of the Hanseatic trading empire of the Baltic and the large scale 
industrial and warfare technology of Imperial Sweden, finally manifesting itself in the Old 
Swedish Policy Model, now in disrepute (Eliasson 2000a, 2004, Eliasson-Ysander 1983). A 
particularly interesting fact is that the Swedish industrialization process, beginning in the 
early 19
th century was geographically distributed being catalyzed in several regions, only to 
be restructured into the current concentrations of  industrial activity around the turn of the 
century. If the ongoing industrial transformations of the European economies are sufficiently 
radical one has to reckon with the possibilities that the  result will be new regional industrial 
configurations.  
 2.1 Characterizing the technology of the New Economy 
The New Economy hype captured the world economic debate  for a few years at the turn of 
the Millenium. Its source was argued to be  New Technology, notably  Computing & 
Communications (C&C) technology and its ultimate manifestation, the Internet, that was 
believed to be on the verge of changing the  world production system. The Internet  had been 
made operational during the first half of the 1990s   as a viable form of information access 
and communication  (Eliasson 2002b,c).However,  practically no one discussed the Internet in 
those terms before 1995. Just before the  bubble of expectations collapsed in 2000 policy 
makers were banking on a new world of continued effortless growth among the already 
wealthy industrial economies and a free lunch for the welfare economies in trouble, whose 
politicians would no longer have to worry about the inflationary consequences of excessive 
public spending . That vision suddenly blew away. Before the discussion had settled the 
industrial world was in the midst of a recession, at places perhaps as bad as that of the 1930s, 
featuring large firms in serious trouble.  
The New technologies being developed over the last half century were, however, still at work 
in those firms, regions and national economies capable of commercializing them, notably in 
the C&C, biotech/pharmaceutical/health care and engineering industries, still offering more or 
less what the reasonable visionaries had been suggesting. In particular, large scale  mass 
production of standardized  products was giving way to a  globally distributed production 
organization offering systemic economies of scale to small players, i e for those having the 
organizational  competence to do it right (Eliasson 1996b, 2002c). Thus flexible and   4
distributed production integrated over  markets of specialized subcontractors and transcending 
national borders was the epitome  of the strong globalization tendency currently 
characterizing the economies of the industrial world, coming in on top of the globalization of 
the financial services industry that began several decades earlier.  Flexible, distributed 
production  is creating entirely new allocations of resources at the regional level (Eliasson 
2003a) and as well great opportunities for policy competition, that can be socially 
advantageous , if done right, but also disastrous for companies, and costly for national 
economies, if done wrong . 
 
 2.2 Short- term distorted asset prices and allocation 
 
Periods of crisis are usually also periods of fundamental economic reorganization. Firms in 
distress are pushed to do something. Large potential systemic productivity gains, furthermore, 
offer incentives for firms to move on the opportunities. While competent crisis management 
results in immediate negative consequences, the positive opportunities can only be enjoyed in 
the long-term. While arbitrage across borders has become increasingly efficient and 
immediate, the same is not the case for  arbitrage over time. Competence, or incentives to 
form rational long-term expectations and to carry on arbitrage accordingly appear to be 
lacking among actors in financial markets, and this is especially the case during the extreme 
phases of the business cycle. Lack of competence will be perceived as greater risks and result 
in myopia. Markets will , therefore, be characterized by large short -term departures from 
long-term prices because incompetent investors cannot simultaneously assess the cyclical 
business situation and the long- term technological opportunities. Firms in crisis , even large 
firms are available  at rock bottom prices, if not protected by dual shares or other protective 
arrangements. 
 
The still lingering global recession, therefore,  has  offered  opportunities for industrially 
competent financial actors to make a fast profit on cheap acquisitions. Firms have also been 
shopping for cheap technology (Eliasson 1991c) and excessively low prices mean that 
mistakes may not be all that privately costly.  But for the same reasons also  incompetent 
buyers may grab the opportunity, and  destroy a company that would have good prospects if 
competently managed. 
There is also the problem that lack of locally competent buyers means that outsiders will pick 
up technologies and move them elsewhere. This is a problem with the sophisticated and 
mobile technology released from the big firms in trouble in the lake Mälar region. 
 
2.3. Policy Competition 
 
While firms may be shopping for cheap technology in global markets, national governments 
are competing for global resource transfers to within their national borders. Local 
governments, however,  have difficulties  making up their minds about what they want; short-
term employment or  technology and long-term growth. Much of the local attractiveness of a 
region is informal and embodied in local institutions and cultures and rests on the local supply 
of knowledge capital, not least  educated and skilled labor. National governments, 
furthermore,  have the prerogative of shaping the legal institutions , but the formation of 
successful regional development  has never been the result of public policy Bresnahan-
Gambardella-Saxenian (2002) state categorically. To do it right, then, policy competence  is 
needed. The nature of that policy competence and policy objectives,  therefore,  is central to 
this analysis of regional policy competition. First, policy competition at the national level  
becomes an  anachronism in an industrial world that is fragmenting into new regions of   5
industrial excellence that do not recognize  national borders. If regional policies aimed at 
attracting resources for long- term expansion clash with national policies  aimed at  short term 
employment or supporting stagnating regions an internal  policy conflict will develop.  
 
Second, the achievement of long- term targets will always involve an immediate period of 
waiting during which short- term adjustment costs dominate. Third, however, political 
unwillingness to accept  those adjustment costs (offering political candy only) is unlikely to 
produce  even short- term comfort if the local receiver competencies  are not in place. Fourth, 
therefore, rational beauty contests or the race for the New Economy will have to aim at 
boosting the capacity of the local attractor  to 
(1) identify winners locally and  globally,  to 
(2) capture  locally released technology for local reinvestment, to 
(3) attract advanced technologies from outside the region and carry the winners on to 
industrial scale production and to 
(4) accept  (given 1 and 2) the loss of simple jobs, and that less advanced production is 
outsourced  of the region to release resources for more advanced local production. 
The implicit assumption of this race is that  an already industrially advanced region should 
only attempt to attract advanced technology . 
To clarify how this can be done we have to introduce the theory of the EOE and of 
Competence Blocs.   
 
 
3.  Policy Competition among Regional Competence Blocs in an         
Experimentally Organized Economy- the theory of the local attractor 
 
The mainstream economic model is not very useful for the study neither of the business cycle, 
nor of economic growth. The Keynsian business cycle model is dead, and Joseph 
Schumpeter´s (1939) ambition to formulate an integrated growth cycle is still in limbo. Both 
the standard neoclassical production model and the so-called New Growth model feature 
information as a virtually free good, requiring no competence and no extra resources to use. 
This is simply wrong for an advanced industrial economy which devotes significantly more 
than half of its total resources to knowledge based information and communication activities 
(Eliasson 1990a,b). Mainstream economic theory makes no distinction between the innovator 
and the entrepreneur and competent venture capitalists have no role to play. There is no room 
for live and behaving actors in the neoclassical economic story and this gives us a model in 
which business mistakes cannot occur by assumption  (Eliasson 1992, 1996a). The 
neoclassical model may be useful as an econometric method to measure economic growth, 
but is of little use for understanding economic growth (Eliasson 2003a), so I need an 
alternative theoretical device to help understanding how regional attractors of global 
resources are  formed and boosted by policy. This theory of the experimentally organized 
economy (EOE) is made up of five ”modules”; 
(1) The  knowledge Based Information Economy that defines the assumptions as to 
business opportunities ( the opportunities space ) and makes ignorance and  business 
failure a natural an unavoidable characteristic of the economy. 
(2) Schumpeterian  creative destruction  that endogenizes economic growth through 
experimental project selection (Table 1). 
(3)  Competence bloc theory that defines the local receiver competence in the economy   6
and determines the dynamic efficiency of the experimental process  through flexibility. 
(4)  Institutions that define incentives, orient competition and  reduce uncertainty 
(property rights) such that the tradability neccessary for market dynamics and  
economic growth is established  and introduce an opening for  market compatible  
policy, and a 
(5) Social capital that provides protection for the individual from the unpredictability and 
arbitrariness  of markets. 
  
3.1  The knowledge Based Economy and the Necessary Presence of  Ignorance 
The neoclassical model implicitly assumes the investment opportunities space to be 
sufficiently small to make the assumption of no or negligible information and 
communications costs to identify and allocate resources in a full information equilibrium 
appear reasonable. I invoke the contrary assumption. The Knowledge Based Economy 
(Eliasson 1990b) features an immense and non-transparent state space that I call the 
investment or business  opportunities space. This state space is by realistic assumption 
impossible to survey more than fractionally by each agent from one point. In the knowledge 
based economy there will always be better allocations of resources than the current one, a 
property that will be decisive in the empirical analysis to follow.  We come up with a model 
economy in which knowledge (or firm and human embodied tacit and difficult to 
communicate knowledge) is the scarce resource, not physical resources. In this economy each 
actor is grossly ignorant about circumstances that will now and then be critical for its 
survival. Hence, business mistakes will be a normal and unavoidable phenomenon in a 
realistically modelled economy, and economic theory has to be explicit in modelling actors´ 
responses to mistaken decisions. Mathematically this situation arises (1) when large resources 
are used up in information processing and communication, so large that they have to be 
factored in as a determinant of the process focus of the economic system (call it an 
equilibrium) and (2) when the technology of using information and communication is subject 
to unpredictable change.  Information and communications costs then have to include the 
economic consequences of business mistakes as a ”transaction cost”, and this (G. Eliasson – 
Å. Eliasson 2002a) turns a number of standard theoretical predictions on their head. But there 
is also a benefit. ( The business opportunities space has no well defined upper limit and is 
bounded from above by the unknown sum total of all knowledge of each actor in the state 
space and all possible useful, but even more unknown combinations of the same knowledge 
(Eliasson 1987b, 1992, 2000b). Hence, search into that  state space for  investment 
opportunities will create new opportunities (new combinations, or data of the state space with 
so far not discovered combinations). The state space keeps expanding from learning and (The 
information paradox, Eliasson 1990b, pp. 46 f) it may even expand faster than actors are 
capable of learning, thus making everybody increasingly ignorant about all that  can be 
learnt  about.
1  This, for one thing, means that the economy will always be operating not only 
far below its production possibility frontiers. The production possibility frontiers and 
opportunity costs are not even determinable in the EOE. This is an implicit assumption in old 
Austrian economics, notably in Carl Menger (1971) and in the Joseph Schumpeter model I 
from 1911. The state space of the EOE grows from being exploited. We have a potential 
positive sum game, which is needed to formulate endogenous growth theory. The key to 
                                                 
1 I have also called this the Särimner effect (Eliasson 1987a, p. 29, 1991a, 1992) from the pig in the Viking 
sagas that was eaten for supper, but returned again next evening to be eaten again. In the Experimentally 
Organized Economy (EOE) that we now enter, the pig even increases in size from being eaten    7
endogenous growth is how this potential positive sum game is activated, and this can only be 
understood at the micro level. 
     (Tables 1 and 2A, B in about here) 
3.2 Macro dynamics through Schumpeterian Creative Destruction 
When something radically new is introduced it almost always occurs through the launching of 
a new product, the establishment of a new division or through the entry of a new firm. A new 
product may be a complement to existing products or a substitute, in the latter case subjecting 
existing producers to competition and forcing them to reorganize and/or rationalize, or die 
(exit). When a competitor introduces a radically new product a firm often cannot cope with 
the new situation through reorganization, because it is staffed with the wrong human capital. 
It then has to contract or shut down, and possibly recruit new personnel to establish a new 
firm. The dynamics of this growth promoting competition is reflected in the dynamics of rent 
formation in financial markets, successful Schumpeterian innovators earning a temporary 
competence rent that will soon be competed away by Kirzner (1973) type imitators or new 
Shumpeterian innovators; a dynamic market game that drives macroeconomic development  
through Table 1. As a consequence the capital market will never be in equilibrium and the 
firm population constantly feature  a wide distribution of rents subjected to constant 
reshuffling over a variable population of incumbent and new firms (Eliasson 1984a). It should 
be recognized that Kenneth Arrow (1959)  asked the profession to address this dynamic 
problem of general oligopolistic competition already in 1959.  The entry/exit process (firm 
turnover), hence, determines economic growth, pushing performance of the entire industry 
upward through the Schumpeterian creative destruction process of Table 1. Entry is moved by 
innovators and economic incentives as determined by the institutions in markets (see below).
2 
If superior entrants and successfully reorganizing firms (the ”winners”) are supported by the 
market and allowed to force inferior firms to exit growth will follow. But this successful 
outcome requires that actors and resource providers be competently guided. The competence 
bloc performs those functions of guidance and resource provision. 
3.3  Competence bloc theory 
Efficient selection in the EOE is defined as the ”minimizing”
3 of the economic incidence of 
two types of errors (in Table 2A), i.e. keeping losers on for too long and ”losing the winners”. 
Centralizing tacit knowledge to one point requires that it can be coded and interpreted as  
                                                 
2 The reasoning can be  illustrated using a Salter (1960) curve. See Eliasson (1996a, pp. 44 f). This is also the 
way growth is endogenized in the Swedish micro-to-macro model (Eliasson 1991a) . It is particularly important 
to observe that innovative entry subjects incumbent firms to competition and forces them to respond. Their 
response in the form of innovative reorganization and desperate rationalization may mean both expansion and 
contraction depending upon incentives embedded in the institutions of the economy and the individual 
competence capital of firms.  
3 Strict mathematical minimizing cannot be achieved since this requires that the entire state space be completely 
searched, which we have assumed to be impossible. Minimization can, however, be approximated in the micro-
to-macro model referred to earlier, and we will then probably find (not done ) that a significant reduction in the 
economic costs of mistakes can be achieved through a better organization of ”search”, but that when we get 
sufficiently close to a possible minimum many possible such and almost equally good situations will be found 
and the price signaling system of a market economy will not be capable of guiding the economy to one of the 
almost equally good solutions. The economic system will be destabilized. See further Eliasson (1984a , 2002c).   8
information, and, hence, reduces the total knowledge that enters each decision to such codable 
knowledge, or communicable information. Since we do not accept this by assumption 
decisions take the form of experimental trials in markets.  Distributing tacit knowledge (or 
human or team embodied competencies) over the market is shown to expose each project to a 
maximum competent and varied evaluation. A competence bloc (Table 2B) lists the minimum 
number of actors that are needed to successfully create, identify, select and commercialize 
new business ideas, i.e. to initiate and develop a new industry (G. Eliasson – Å.Eliasson 
1996). 
 The perhaps most important product feature demanded in an advanced market is product or 
quality variation.  The producer can guess, but he has to try it before he knows. Only the 
customers can individually decide which variant they prefer. This places the customer in core. 
One critical task of the competence bloc, hence, is to make sure that customers’ preferences  
filter down to the actors in the competence bloc that create and select innovations. This 
requires that both customers and products be  well defined, such that property rights can be 
assigned to contractual commitments throughout the competence bloc, making trading in 
these commitments possible such that the right prices be signaled, losers filtered away and 
winners selected. The competence bloc becomes an allocator of tacit competencies (Eliasson 
– Eliasson 2002a).  The customer, hence (first) , occupies a premier position in competence 
bloc analysis. The products created and chosen never get better than what customers are 
capable of appreciating and willing to pay for. The long-term direction of technical change, 
therefore, is always set by the customers. This is so even though the innovator, entrepreneur 
or industrialist takes the initiative. But quite often the customer takes the initiative. 
Technological development, therefore, requires a sophisticated customer base, capable of 
appreciating new products. The more advanced and radically new the product technologies, 
the more important customer quality becomes. The customers of the competence bloc 
contribute (commercial) competence in the technological choice process. They accept or 
reject products offered them in the market, thereby signalling what they want. But they also 
actively look for products that they need, and they may be directly involved, contributing 
knowledge to the development of a product. This is often the case when it comes to  advanced 
and complicated products such as military and commercial airplanes (Eliasson 1995, 2001b ). 
As already observed by Burenstam–Linder (1961) the customers of the rich economies 
contribute to their comparative advantages. In terms of competence bloc theory, local access 
to affluent and competent customers is a strong regional attractor for advanced firms. 
Second, basic technology is internationally available, but the capacity to identify it and make 
a business of it requires local competence. Part of this receiver competence (Eliasson 1986a, 
1990a, 1996a, pp. 8, 14) is the ability to create new winning combinations of old and new 
technologies (innovation). A rich and varied supply of subcontractor (technology) services, 
therefore, is part of the innovation supply that enters the economic selection process of the 
competence bloc through that slot.
4 
Third, some actors or organizations are better than others when it comes to achieving 
intellectual order in a seemingly chaotic business situation. We call them entrepreneurs. The 
task of the entrepreneur is to identify commercial winners among the suppliers of innovations 
and to get his/her technology choice on a commercial footing. The innovator and the 
entrepreneur are difficult agents for the  economic theorist. Their behavior is by their very 
nature unpredictable , which was also the notion advocated by the young Joseph Schumpeter 
(1911). Attempts to work the innovator and the entrepreneur into mainstream theory, even 
                                                 
4 Carlsson (1995, 1997) has modeled that innovation supply under the name technological systems.   9
though many, have, however, failed. Baumol (1968) regards the task as difficult and 
impossible over a foreseeable future, and argues that for the time being we will have to be 
satisfied with less rigorous verbal theorizing. 
The entrepreneur, however, rarely has resources of his own to move the project forward. He, 
therefore, (fourth) needs funding from a competent venture capitalist, i.e. a provider of risk 
capital, capable of understanding innovators of radically new technology, identifying business 
needs and providing context. The money is the least important thing. What matters  is the 
industrial competence needed  to understand and identify winners and, hence, provide 
reasonably priced equity funding.
5  
Without a rich endowment of venture capital competence, you won’t see many entrepreneurs. 
Hence, the venture capitalist and his escape (exit) market (fifth) are the  important incentive 
supporting actors. With no understanding venture capitalists the price of new capital will be 
prohibitively high, or funding will not be available, and winners will be lost. With badly 
functioning exit markets the incentives for venture capitalists will be small and, hence, also 
for the entrepreneurs and the innovators.  
Finally and sixth, when the selection process has run its course and winners have been 
selected a new type of industrial competence is needed to take the winners on to industrial 
scale production and distribution. We cannot tell in advance what the formal role of the 
industrialist is (CEO, chairman of the Board, an active owner etc.). He or she figures in the 
competence bloc on account if his or her capacity to contribute functional competence. Also 
at this stage winners can be lost to the local economy due to lack of  management 
competence. Part of the regional location factors at this level, we will find below, depend on  
the supply of such competence. The task of carrying winners on to industrial scale production 
( Table 1) is critical for macro economic growth. 
We can also conclude that completeness of the competence bloc is a necessary requirement 
for the viable incentive structures that guarantee increasing returns to continued search of 
winners, i.e. for new industry formation. None of the ”pillars” (the actors) of the competence 
bloc can be missing, or this complete incentive structure will fail to develop (G. Eliasson – Å. 
Eliasson 1996).  The extreme diversity of the opportunity set of the EOE means that the 
competence needed to identify winners cannot be specified in advance. Hence, an efficient 
project identification and selection in the competence bloc requires that a large number of 
each type of actor in the competence bloc be present. Such horizontal variety is a necessary 
condition for maximum exposure of each project to a competent and varied evaluation. 
Compared to the internal project evaluation in a large firm direct transaction costs may be 
higher, since the evaluation is done in a distributed fashion, involving many independent 
actors in the market. Narrowing down the evaluation to an internal procedure within a 
hierarchy, on the other hand, raises the risk of losing a winner that constitutes the really large 
transaction cost, and hence is likely to lower the efficiency of project selection (Eliasson – 
Eliasson 2002). This is not uncommon. Large firms, such as IBM internalized most of their 
competence for a long time and exposed themselves to a conservative project selection and 
business history is full of near losses, the only ones that can be identified (Eliasson 2001b). In 
a complete and horizontally varied competence bloc potential winners are exposed to a 
                                                 
5 A venture capitalist in the competence bloc is defined as a provider of finance with such industrial competence. 
The venture capitalists so defined also contribute managerial, financing and marketing competence through their 
network, but this comes after the ”understanding”. Such services are normally available in the market and, 
consequently, are less critical; see G. Eliasson – Å. Eliasson (1996) and Eliasson (1997b).    10
maximum  varied competent evaluation such that they experience increasing returns to 
continued search for resources.  
3.4   Critical mass creates a combined  local spillover source and  global resource attractor - 
the advanced firm as a technical  university 
A complete and horizontally varied competence bloc functions as a technological spillover 
source. Advanced firms are (1) attracted since they can benefit from an ample supply of 
complementary technology spillovers. But as they establish in the competence bloc (2) they 
also spill new technology to  the firms already established there. In that sense advanced firms 
function as technical universities, but not only that.  Spillovers also have to be identified as 
commercially viable and introduced in the production system.  One could say that the 
economic value of spillovers depends on the local ability (receiver competence) to 
commercialize the spilled technology. One can therefore say that the competence bloc defines 
the receiver competence (Eliasson 1986a,pp.57f,95, 1990a) at the national level, an idea 
discussed already by Abramowitz (1988).
6 
Together this means that the full fledged competence bloc turns the spillovers created by the 
research and industrial activities of advanced firms established there both into ”functionally 
operational technical universities” and commercially viable ventures (joint production, 
Eliasson, 1996b, 2001b). Advanced firms thus compete with the established technical 
universities as educational institutions, providing on the job learning and experience 
development in a large area of production where standard educational institutions  have little 
competence and where classroom teaching is not a viable educational method.  
3.5 Institutions define the nature of incentives and competition and offer a role for  policy 
Even Karl Marx conceded that the capitalist organization of production had a unique capacity 
to create wealth. He , however overlooked two important things, namely that (1) capitalist 
investments were subjected to great uncertainty and (2) that capitalist markets needed the 
support of a sophisticated  property rights institution. One function of  supporting market 
institutions is to reduce uncertainty , a fact that  the formerly planned economies have had 
great difficulties coping with (see Eliasson 1998) 
Over the centuries a steady increase in business uncertainty can be observed. This increase, 
however, has its origin in the creative destruction process. The more creative an economy  
the more destructive it becomes, because of the increase in the number of innovative and 
competing players. Increased competition also increases the rate of business failure. Hence 
even an increased rate of business failure should be regarded as a normal cost for  economic 
development 
A complete and horizontally varied competence bloc will optimize the allocation and use of 
the existing competence mass and spillovers will characterize the developing competence 
bloc. These spillovers will diffuse along many ways and both further reinforce the internal 
development  of the bloc and contribute serendipitously to other related and unrelated 
industries (Eliasson 1997a, 2001a). But growth doesn’t automatically follow from technology 
creation and spillovers. Diffusion has to be supported by markets and markets have to be 
supported by the necessary uncertainty reducing institutions, notably property rights (Eliasson 
– Wihlborg 2002). Only then will the potential systemic effects through resource reallocation 
be realized and the Schumpeterian creative destruction process of Table 1 result in growth.  
                                                 
6 Their situation is summarized in terms of the three information paradoxes of Eliasson (1990b, 2002b) .   11
Institutions  open a slot for market compatible policy interference in the economic system. By 
shaping  institutions such that incentives promote socially positive growth behaviour among 
agents and competition prevents socially negative monopoly formation, policy can prevent 
distorted price signalling in markets thus  preventing the ”destruction”  of long-term winners  
(competition policy). The most important such policy support of market transactions has to do 
with the establishment of an efficient property rights legislation, the most intriguing problem 
of the formerly planned economies. Also taxes can both eliminate and distort rate of return 
prospects, and – together with regulation – turn markets requiring long-term commitments on 
the part of investors into myopic trading bazaars.( Making new competitive entry easy and 
profitable is  a better competition policy than enforcing corporate break ups when the 
monopolies have already been formed argue Baumol (1982) and  Audretsch – Baumol – 
Burke (2001). An even better example is Swedish bankruptcy law which makes tax debts 
preferential claims, meaning that the Swedish state often asks the public debt collector to 
force an innovative winner into bankruptcy - a great entrepreneurial discourager.)   
3.6  The shake loose hypothesis and the role of social capital in overcoming  political 
resistance to structural change- policy competence derived 
While firms have to cope with the consequences of competition, such is the morale of the 
market, people do not like the consequences of business failure , for instance in the form of 
involuntary unemployment. Political resistance therefore sets an upper limit to the 
performance of the experimentally organized economy. Social capital can be defined as an 
asset embodied in the individual and in society that make people able to cope with an 
unpredictable local environment and with arbitrary treatment in markets. Local economic 
environments that lack such social capital are not attractive for foreign investors. Social 
capital is  important, but we leave this here as an observation only  ( See Eliasson  2001a).  
One prediction of the EOE is that more, and rather much more, efficient allocations of 
resources exist than the current one. The realization of these better allocations is, however, 
conditional on the existence of sufficient local organizational competence as embodied in the 
local competence bloc and a willingness on the part of the participants of the system to absorb 
the social adjustment costs and make the effort needed to succeed (social capital). Given that, 
a crisis among the incumbent firms can be viewed as an opportunity (rather than a crisis) 
since resources with competence will now be shaken loose from existing structures to be 
more easily available for more efficient allocations elsewhere. 
The new allocation, however, will not necessarily be in the local (original) neighborhood. It 
sometimes occurs abroad and the more so the more sophisticated the assets. If sufficient local 
receiver competence does not exist, localization abroad is a better alternative than the 
complete close down of an innovative project. It is, however, not good for the local region if 
outlocalization occurs by mistake because of distorted asset prices and/or insufficient receiver 
competence. A key policy task, therefore, is to support the  development of  local and 
industrially competent financial markets, capable of taking a long-term view ( read vertically 
complete and horizontally varied competence blocs) to make the local region capable not only 
to capture the resources shaken loose from the local firms but also to attract new resources 
from outside the region. 
Policy is part of the institutional infrastructure of an economy.  Policy can be designed to 
work with or against  markets. The last few decades have witnessed a stengthening of markets 
relative to policy , globalization being one example. The odds, hence, are against local or 
national policies attempting to  squelch global market forces. The rational policy maker works   12
with the markets. Discretionary national political interference  with the national economy is 
also at odds with both  most European Community principles and other international 
agreements. Hence, policy competition between nations for global resources is a politically 
delicate matter. 
When seen in this perspective the five modules of the theory of the Experimentally Organized 
Economy offers the possibility to derive the market compatible policy solution of how (  the 
nation or the region) to  compete politically by being  good at organizing the local economy 
for efficient production or how to create a regional economic attractor for investment. This  
means that local economies with good institutions  outcompete  the less successful local 
communities creating  increased regional   economic diversity. This is  the expected  outcome 
of policy competition. This is also the way the industrial regions were created during the 
industrial revolution some 200 years ago. This theory of efficient and socially acceptable 
policy competition will now be applied to two  regional economies more or less in structural 
transformation. 
 
4.   The Lake Mälar Industrial Competence Blocs
7 - a case study based 
regional opportunity analysis 
The receiver competence embodied in the industrial competence blocs is particularly 
important during periods of regional and global recession. A recession often initiates a 
delayed restructuring  and generates a different allocation of resources  than would be the 
case during a normal economic situation.  The Lake Mälar region around Stockholm features 
three industrial competence blocs from the old as well as the new industry. Some large firms 
in those competence blocs are  in crisis or undergoing radical structural reorganization as a 
consequence of a foreign merger, releasing significant  resources in the market. The key 
question is: Is this an opportunity for industrial transformation or a source of great concern? 
Will the released technologies be reinvested locally in time, or be moved out of the country? 
Will  the Lake Mälar region  make it into the New Economy?  
4.1  Distressed markets and disturbed asset prices generate long-term resource 
misallocations  
Periods of crisis are usually also periods of fundamental economic reorganization. Firms in 
distress are pushed to do something. Large potential  productivity effects, furthermore, offer 
great incentives for firms to move on the opportunities.  
While arbitrage across borders has become increasingly efficient and immediate, this is not 
the case for arbitrage over time. Competence, or incentives to form rational long-term 
expectations and to carry on arbitrage accordingly is generally lacking among actors in 
financial markets, and this is especially the case during the extreme phases of the business 
cycle. Asset markets will, therefore, be characterized by large short-term departures from 
long-term prices because incompetent investors cannot assess the long-term industrial 
                                                 
7 This section relates the micro dynamics of a region in the form of case studies to the macro growth level. Since 
the representation of the macro dynamics requires  a far better resolution  than the firm löevel and what is 
possible to present in this paper for the full documentation we refer the reader to Eliasson (2004).  The stylized 
frame for relating the micro dynamics to the macro level is Table 1. Table 1 is also the growth engine of the 
Swedish micro-to-macro model used to simulate the New Economy creation in Eliasson -Johansson-Taymaz 
(2002).   A shorter version of this industrial analysis of the Lake Mälar region (authored together with my 
daughter Åsa)  has been published under the title: The Northern Corridor of Industrial Excellence in  New 
Northern Knowledge, Hagbart Publishing, Bollschweil, 2002, pp. 56-57.    13
consequences of the cyclical business situation.
8  As a consequence project selection through 
the competence bloc is likely to be dominated by myopic and unnecessary wealth 
redistributions and inefficient allocations of resources. The solution to these problems lies in 
the existence of complete and horizontally  varied competence blocs that  will guarantee that 
if holders of assets are too depressed by myopia competent long-term investors will soon find 
it profitable to enter the market. A complete and horizontally varied competence bloc, 
therefore, has to include a sufficiently large number of competent long-term investors who 
will capture the longer term winners during a cyclically depressed situation, at a  profit, and 
before they are lost at the bottom of a recession. 
(Which kind of business mistakes are committed during the recession because of significantly 
distorted asset prices?  We have the possibility that; 
1.  Excessively low asset prices induce sloppy acquisitions because mistakes are not so 
costly. 
2.    Foreigners acquire (Swedish) technology (high tech firms) cheaply. 
3.  Crisis firms are closed down for good despite good long-term prospects, and resources 
released in the market. 
4.   Undervalued firms fail because they are acquired by the wrong investor (”bad 
competence bloc”). 
5.  Resources are underused because investments are delayed in cautious firms. Hence, some 
firms fail. 
 While items 1 and 4 easily lead to a loss of winners, items 2 and 3 are not necessarily bad. 
They are better than to lose the value of the winner altogether. Crisis undervaluation of assets 
can ,therefore, have positive consequences. 
  a)   Rationally motivated exits are speeded up and resources are released for more 
efficient employment elsewhere. 
  b)  Firm management has an excuse to make politically unpleasant adjustments that 
should rather have been made during the business upswing. 
  c)  Outsourcing to more efficient subcontractors is induced. 
d)  Competent foreign firms buy cheap local assets. This is, however, better for the 
technology holder than getting an incompetent local owner, or being forced to exit 
altogether.)   
4.2 The three Competence Blocs- Industrial Diversity 
During the 1970s Swedish manufacturing industry was ranked very high in industrial 
excellence, in fact, very close to the leading industrial nations the US, Germany and Japan, 
and well ahead of other industrial nations in exhibiting a very diversified technology base, 
notably in engineering (Pavitt – Soete 1981). That base has since then narrowed down 
dangerously for Sweden at large, but it has been maintained and been further developed in 
Sweden’s supreme industrial region surrounding the Lake Mälar and including the cities 
Stockholm, Södertälje, Uppsala and Västerås with a total population of more than 2½ million. 
Above all, the Mälardalen competence blocs of industrial excellence rank ahead of other 
Northern European regions when it comes to exhibiting a strong presence of both an 
                                                 
8 An alternative explanation would be that financial experts play games with less knowledgeable players. The 
consequences will be the same, but the first explanation is the most credible one.   14
advanced and mature (1) engineering industry and innovative new industry formation, notably 
in (2) computing and communications (C&C) and in (3) biotech, biomedical and 
pharmaceutical industries. To this we add the fourth  (4) financial services industry, which 
today lacks globally excellent players in Sweden, but still counts as  the most advanced 
financial services industry in Northern Europe. The closest competing regions exhibiting the 
same range of industrial technology would be southern Germany; Bavaria and Baden 
Würtenberg . 
The integration of mature industrial technologies with new technologies occurring today, such 
as the integration of both bio and engineering technology with computing and 
communications technology is creating entirely new industrial entities. Parallel to that, a 
surge in the creation of entirely new industries through new firm establishment can be 
witnessed, both in the C&C and the biomedical markets. This is the technology and 
innovation sides of the Lake Mälar competence blocs featuring excellence in computing and 
communications, biomedical and health, engineering and financial services markets. The 
presence of an advanced customer base, several universities and Sweden’s most prestigious 
technical university, as well as a broad and varied base of subcontractors serving all four 
competence blocs allow for an increasingly flexible and distributed organization of both 
development work and production. The region is also host to the Corporate Headquarter 
(CHQ) of most large Swedish multinationals and features the most advanced capital market in 
northern Europe and a venture capital industry under development that is still bested only by 
London and the two centers on the west and the east coasts of the US (Eliasson 1997b, 
2001c). Financial and venture capital competence is critical for successful new industry 
formation in the biomedical and C&C markets. As a consequence the Stockholm, Södertälje, 
Uppsala and Västerås area is also the leading northern European region in New Industry 
formation, and easily outranks the rest of Sweden in new firm establishment and fast growing 
firms. 
Four competitive advantages or strong competence blocs characterize the region. 
First, on the technology side the entire health industry is well represented, including several 
leading academic hospitals. Among them the award of the Nobel prize in medicine has made 
Karolinska world famous. Stockholm and Uppsala offer a strong university base in 
biomedical and biotech research. Several  biomedical (KaroBio, Pyrosequencing) and medical 
devices and equipment firms (Electa, Gambro etc.) populate the region with especially strong 
centers in Uppsala and Stockholm. The main R&D center of Astra Zeneca is located in 
Södertälje. Even though the internal reorganization of this new British/Swedish firm may 
mean sudden change in its global allocation of activities, the firm has pledged large 
investments in, and a future concentration of R&D to Södertälje quoting the supply of 
scientifically trained and industrially experienced labor as an attractive attribute of the region.  
Pharmacia has gone through several radical reorganizations during the last ten years. It 
merged with US UpJohn (into PharmaciaUpJohn) in 1995, acquired US Monsanto in 2000, to 
spin off the agricultural arm as Monsanto in 2002 and be renamed  as Pharmacia Corporation, 
only to be acquired by US Pfizer in 2002, which is rapidly divesting itself of what it considers 
non-core activities. Old Pharmacia still has a considerable presence in Uppsala among a host 
of new start-ups, many of which are based on competences developed in Pharmacia. The last 
ten years or so  highlight the  entrepreneurial transformation of the biomedical industry in the 
Uppsala region in the wake of the partial Pharmacia withdrawal from the city. Using 
competence bloc analysis the net long-term effect on the Uppsala region of the release of 
industrially experienced entrepreneurial people and research into new firms is predicted to be 
positive   and preliminary econometric research does not reject that hypothesis (see below).   15
Innovative technology, two large universities and the very advanced customer base in the 
large hospitals suggest that the region has the technological potential to become the home of 
Europe’s leading health industry. (Eliasson 1997c, 2002a, Eliasson-Eliasson 2002b, ISA 
1997). 
Second, the Lake Mälar region already features the world’s most advanced agglomeration of 
mobile telecommunications technology with Ericsson in Stockholm and Nokia just across the 
Baltic, rapidly moving the technology into the broadband and  mobile Internet market. 
Stockholm is also the home of the major telecommunications operators, including Telia, 
which   merged with Finish Sonera in 2002 and most of the related software and 
programming competence. Critical mass of this competence bloc has already been reached, 
the stakes are  high and most international firms in the technology have a presence in the area. 
Technological spillovers are abundant leading to the creation of many new industries. To give 
an interesting  special example, the area has one of the largest representations in the world in 
on- line game design and the entertainment industry, notably popular music, that is driven by 
the expected emergence of broadband mobile Internet and the possibility to serve the rapidly 
growing market for on-line multiplayer games.  Recently (2003) however, the deep crisis of 
the global telecom industry has dramatically   cooled the activity level in this industry and 
placed Ericsson, as well as its entire industrial support structure, on crisis alert. Both Ericsson 
and Telia have released human capital in the market during the 1990s and notably in the last 
few years, all growth in employment in the industry has taken place in small firms, notably 
very small and newly established firms (Johansson 2001). 
Third, some of the most advanced Swedish international engineering firms are located in the 
Mälardalen area, several of them also with their headquarters. They represent the whole range 
from heavy engineering to fine mechanical technology and are supported by a strong network 
of advanced subcontractors. ABB, one of the world’s leading electrical equipment 
manufacturers has a strong presence around the Lake Mälar, notably in Västerås. It is, 
however, currently in crisis and is reorganizing itself to maintain its position as the world 
leader in electricity distribution and as a solutions supplier in engineering, implementations 
and applications. Electrolux is the world’s largest white ware appliance manufacturer 
headquartered in  Stockholm, as is Atlas Copco, the world leader in the air compression 
business and in pneumatic, hydraulic and electric tools. Volvo Construction Equipment 
(VCE), localized in Eskilstuna ( on the Lake Mälar) comes in as the  third largest player in the 
world in its market, after Catepillar and Komatzu. While some previous global Swedish stars , 
such as AGA and Nobel Industries after many years of failed attempts to reorganize for a new 
market situation have been swallowed by large foreign firms (German Linde and Dutch 
Akzo) , a few new players have successfully climbed through the industrialization phase of 
the competence block, among them  the world No 1 player in security locks AssaAbloy.  
Besides the research center of Astra Zeneca, Södertälje is also the home of Scania, one of the 
world’s three largest and the most profitable of the heavy truck manufacturers, and Alfa Laval 
the world’s leading manufacturer of industrial heat exchangers and separation equipment, 
currently being reintroduced on the Stockholm stock exchange after having been part of the 
Tetra Pak group for some years. The firms mentioned are international and big and all 
engaged in the emerging industrial competence of distributed production that increasingly 
characterizes the engineering industries of advanced economies, featuring the systems 
integration competence of globally coordinating the allocation of industrial competence 
capital, development work and manufacturing and distribution. Only a few industrial 
countries, among them Sweden, has developed that competence.    16
4.3 Specialist subcontractor supplies  
 The local availability of specialist subcontractors has been  mentioned as a locally attractive 
feature by the large firms in all three industries. An advanced specialist subcontractor industry 
holds a significant part of the local technology supply. The resource shake out from some of 
the large players affects this situation in several ways. First, the demand for specialist 
subcontractor services is reduced because of the diminished activity level. At the same time 
the supply of subcontractor services increases, since the released resources often reestablish 
themselves as subcontractors to its previous ”parent”. In the ABB case  a large part of the 
resource release has been in the form of outsourcing where ABB has remained the main 
customer. The increase in subcontractor supply, because of the shake out, furthermore, has 
become an additional resource for the region and a platform for growth for the subcontractors 
which can now distribute their production over many customers. A rich supply of 
subcontractor services lowers entry barriers in industries, previously dominated by large firms 
and large economies of scale. Among the potential winners we find Haldex , which is based 
on the production at Garphyttan of special valve steel for the global automotive industry, but 
has developed into a global performer in four wheel drive systems. Volvo uses Haldex´ 
system and has located the development a new SUV platform for Ford in Köping on the Lake 
Mälar, where German Gertrag and US Dana will also be involved in building the largest 
factory in Europe for four wheel drive systems. 
4.4  A unique concentration of corporate headquarters 
The Lake Mälar financial services industry features the largest  stock exchange in  Northern 
Europe, now run by an innovative new player in the global derivatives market (OM) and the 
corporate headquarters (CHQs) of a number of large firms, including Atlas Copco, Electrolux, 
Ericsson, Scania and, as well, the headquarters of all the large Swedish banks. OM in fact 
made an unsuccessful bid in 2000 to acquire the London Stock Exchange. In 2002 the London 
Stock Exchange in turn was courting OM, offering to buy it or cooperate with it. In 2003 OM 
acquired the Helsinki stock exchange and changed the name to OMHEX. Whichever way, a 
financial bridge between Stockholm, Helsinki and London would introduce a new dimension 
to financial life in the Lake Mälar region. The effects could go in all three directions in terms 
of attracting foreign investments to the Lake Mälar region, depending on the strength and 
diversity of the local industries.  
In fact, the three, in many  ways mutually supporting industrial competence blocs have 
already reached critical momentum and should function as attractors of other advanced 
companies to the region. The corporate headquarter factor is important, being largely 
financial, concerned with strategic acquisitions, the valuation of the company, relations to 
financial markets and the global allocation of its resources . That function requires interaction 
with a sophisticated financial community with competent and industrially experienced  
financial analysts. This is a dimension where the Lake Mälar region compares well with 
Northern Europe at large, but not with London and the US, and hence, has to be further 
developed to remain a strong attractor of industrial competence . Since the CHQ is often the 
ultimate end of a successful career in a large firm, a large number of CHQs in a region is an 
attractor of talented, knowledgeable and entrepreneurial and also interesting people (Eliasson 
2001c). 
4.5  Is the unique capacity of Swedish international firms to serve as sophisticated   17
management schools in jeopardy? 
An interesting aspect of the western educational system is the belief in a large number of elite 
educational institutions staffed with professors with no or little experience in management, 
leadership and entrepreneurship that teach management, leadership and entrepreneurship. The 
other side of the same coin is the common belief among industry people that the best 
management education available is a successful career in an advanced international firm 
(Eliasson 1984, 1994, 1996c). The quality of that education is to a large extent decided by the 
choices and the efforts of the career candidate him- or herself, and Electrolux during the reign 
of its entrepreneurial CEO Hans Werthén was long regarded as the best management school 
in Sweden. 
This rosy picture has, however, changed considerably during the 1990s. The large Swedish 
international giants are no longer as successful, several are in trouble and several  have been 
acquired by foreign firms and the question is if the managers of today are as excellent as those 
of the past, and, therefore, if the firms still operate the dual functions of being both excellent 
firms and excellent management schools. There are four possible explanations. One would be 
that Swedish industry has been extremely lucky since the earlier industrial revolution in being 
able to breed so many large and successful industrial giants, but now, finally, luck is running 
out. The other explanation would be that the special Swedish policy (of the old Swedish 
policy model; see Eliasson – Ysander 1981) of favouring a select group of large giants 
through legislation, generous attention and biased regulation does not work in the New 
emerging industrial structures and that the negative long-run effects (of the same policy) on 
new and small firms are now becoming visible. A third possibility would be that the emerging 
New industrial structures are so much more competitive and so much more difficult to cope 
with that the old management excellence has no longer been competitive during the 1990s . 
Hence, the protection offered by the Swedish policy model has turned into a long-term 
disadvantage by locking Swedish management into the wrong experience.  There is also a 
fourth and more intriguing possibility. The inhouse, career management school is being 
disorganized and/or global demand for Swedish management talent is increasing. Large firms 
are fragmenting and distributing their production. Foreign firms are acquiring Swedish large 
firms and CHQs are being moved abroad. Together, the systematic career monitoring and 
selection is no longer functioning as well and the peaking of a career increasingly occurs 
abroad, not necessarily in a Swedish firm. The management school of the real world no longer 
works well under the transition from an old to a New economy. The new engineering industry 
with distributed production does not offer a repetitive management experience of the old 
engineering industry and to apply an excellent CEO management experience from the old 
international engineering giants to a biotech or a C&C research intensive firm is often a  
mistake (Eliasson 2002d).   
4.6  The dominant large firms 
For a long time the Swedish economy has been dominated by large international firms and 
much of the earlier policy concern has been about the possible loss of pull effect on the entire 
economy of these firms. Thus foreign  investments by these firms for a long time was 
regarded as something negative. The pull effect was also very large (Eliasson 1985a, 
especially Bergholm’s appendix). More recently these theories have been reversed into a 
worry about the exposure or dependence of the entire Swedish economy of a small number of 
large firms that will  eventually fail or leave the country (Andersson et al. 1993, Eliasson 
1993a, Glete 1998). What will there be to fill in?      
The large international firms of the Lake Mälar region, to be presented in some detail below,   18
represent current and (at least) former excellence in their field. One large firm in each of the 
three industrial competence blocs is in trouble (ABB and Ericsson) or have been through a 
radical reorganization, partly withdrawing from Sweden (Pharmacia). The first observation to 
be made is that the Lake Mälar economic region exhibits a stunning example of industrial 
excellence to host such a large number of large international players, considering its total 
population of just above 2½ million. The surprising thing is that this is the first time that 
several very large Swedish multinationals are simultaneously in trouble . The first  question is 
whether this should be regarded as something of serious concern for the economic future of 
the region.  The extreme dominance in each industry of a few very large firms in Sweden 
should rather be the cause for concern. Resources locked into these big corporations in the 
long term would rather be more efficiently employed elsewhere, in new small and more 
innovative firms. The historically heavy concentration of excellence in this region also means 
that a significant infrastructure of skilled workers and scientifically trained people, and 
specialist subcontractors, serving these industries should still be in place. This infrastructure 
should be a locational advantage for new start ups of people with competence leaving the 
crisis firms  for foreign investors.  
A key transformation factor, however, will be that to recapture value and  growth new firms 
and the existing firms will have to pick up released resources and start to grow. This is a 
fairly new situation for Sweden, and circumstances are not entirely favorable. The new 
”Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2002” (GEM)  on new firm establishment places Sweden 
close to bottom among the industrialized  economies when it comes to new firm 
establishment. This may not be so surprising. Sweden is deficient in venture capital 
competence (Eliasson 1997b) and – for being such a rich country – in many kinds of 
infrastructures, such as motorways and also other forms of transports. And the Swedish tax 
system is a formidable  discourager of personal wealth formation through successful 
entrepreneurship. Compared to the rest of  Sweden,  Stockholm , nevertheless,  features the 
most competent financial services infrastructure which puts Mälardalen at an advantage 
compared to the Malmö/Lund/Copenhagen and Gothenburg regions, Malmö/Lund/CPH, 
representing a growing biotech competence bloc and Gothenburg/Trollhättan/Uddevalla a 
(heavy) engineering competence bloc. If policy makers do not handle this regional problem 
right the industrial pick up among new and small firms in the Lake Mälar region might stall. 
The pick up on the basis of the internationally mobile and very competent resources released 
will not take place in Sweden outside the Lake Mälar region. If not in the Lake Mälar region 
there might be no pick up at all, or it will occur in another country. 
(Some positive signs can, however, be noted. Johansson (2001) observes that employment 
growth in the C&C industry in Sweden during the last 10 years has all been carried by the 
new and very small firms. The large firms, and notably Ericsson and Telia, have significally 
reduced their employment. 
G. Eliasson – Å. Eliasson  (2002b) observe that the Swedish health care sector is superbly 
positioned technologically to become a European industrial leader in the field, if only the 
health care competence bloc could be made complete and sufficiently varied, and policy 
makers made willing to let the actors in the sector behave and compete as in other advanced 
industries. Some positive results can also be reported from the Uppsala studies on what has 
happened in the wake of the Pharmacia withdrawal (see further below). 
Finally, ABB may be in crisis, but Atlas Copco, Electrolux and Scania and a number of other 
players in engineering industry are in good shape. They should be able to pick up the slack in 
the region, and ABB might even return to normal fairly soon. Its big problem is the hangover 
from its excessive acquisitions spree in the past, the    large asbestos damages from its   19
subsidiary (Combustion Engineering) in the US, and the German and Swiss operations.)    
4.7  The Pharmacia withdrawal from Uppsala – testing the shake out hypothesis 
Pharmacia, which dominated the biotech and pharmaceutical industry in Uppsala, merged 
with US UpJohn in 1995 and has since withdrawn from, and spun off a large part of its earlier 
presence in the Uppsala region. The CHQ was moved to Peapack in New Jersey in 1995, and 
significant personnel resources with a scientific background and industrial experience have 
been released in the Uppsala market . The Pharmacia case offers a social science experiment 
that makes it possible to test our previous predictions from the theory of the EOE that  more 
efficient allocations of resources than the current one always exist and can be realized if the 
requisite local receiver competence (a vertically complete and horizontally varied competence 
bloc) is in place. 
Seven years have passed since the shake out and – if the hypothesis is correct –  at least some 
of the immediate reduction in employment in the industry should have been absorbed in other 
related industries and/or in new companies. The only caveat is that the period is still too short 
to test for this long-run hypothesis and that some technologies  have spilled outside the 
region. Fridh (2002) has tested  the shake out resource reallocation hypothesis in Uppsala 
econometrically, using a statistical material covering all biotech, medical instrument and 
pharmaceutical companies in Sweden. She has performed two tests. The first was carried out 
on firm (establishment) data. Individual establishment growth (in employment) is related to a 
number of firm explanatory variables such as establishment age, size, ownership etc. and a 
Uppsala dummy representing the exit of Pharmacia. The other test is regional using the same 
age, size and ownership variables and in addition regional firm turnover variables. Since firm 
turnover is higher than normal in the Uppsala region (because of the Pharmacia withdrawal) 
this test is an indirect test of the Pharmacia shake out hypothesis. The first test gave no 
significant direct result on the Pharmacia shake out hypothesis, even though all the 
coefficients had the correct signs. The turnover test, however, turned out strongly significant. 
Given the caveats and the mixed results I feel confident to  stay with the shake out hypothesis 
to be tested further when more years have passed. 
4.8  Prospects for positive change 
The previous analysis is  clear in its results. The Lake Mälar region has developed into an 
impressive concentration of industrial competence, notably in the three industrial competence 
blocs. The population base for this impressive concentration of industrial competence is only  
2½ million, and the broad base has been maintained through the outsourcing of simple 
production, notably production workers, to other areas of the country and abroad. During the 
second half of the 1990s, however, several dominant firms, and previous excellent players 
have fallen on bad luck and have been shrinking and releasing competent labour. This 
situation is  pronounced for the Lake Mälar region but also typical for the rest of Sweden, and 
the mirror image of stagnating and even failing large firms is the stagnation at the macro level 
in the last decades shown for Sweden in Figure 1. Return to fast growth will be conditional on 
the released resources being reinvested locally in more productive work than before. Part of 
this will have to be in the large firms now being successfully reorganized on a smaller scale 
(item 2, Table 1) but above all in new firms and small winners rapidly picking up resources 
and being carried through the competence bloc to industrial scale  production and distribution 
(item 6, Table 2B). The prospects for this to happen in Sweden, an economy not recently 
known for viable entrepreneurship  and new firm establishment are not overwhelmingly 
positive. And many new firms with the right technology and an entrepreneurial mentality are 
needed to fill the vacuum left by contracting large firms.   20
A full scale expansion in all industries in line with the industrial potentials would draw 
considerable human capital resources that to a great extent will have to be supplied from 
outside  the region. Looked at from the point of view of all Sweden we  have a clear case of 
increasing regional diversity coming up. For the Lake Mälar region to go through a successful 
transformation, sophisticated human capital will have to be attracted from other parts of the 
country, most probably from the established university cities with existing industrial 
neighbourhoods and from abroad. Here, however, the Lake Mälar regional economy will be 
facing competition from other attractive regions also with a considerable supply of human 
capital, and in almost all cases with a much more attractive tax environment and in most cases 
also a more pleasant climate. 
The physical infrastructure in the Lake Mälar region is not well developed. Four lane roads of 
motorway standard have not been built to match a wealthy industrial economy and housing is 
scarce, to a considerable extent because of rent regulation. In the longer run we are 
discussing, however, this could be attended to. Land is not scarce and if a high capacity  
transport and commuter system could be developed  to tie a larger population of the Lake 
Mälar cities together,  all production would not have to be concentrated to Stockholm and 
daily commuting through the entire region would be a possibility. 
It is not realistic to expect such an infrastructure and the needed amenities to develop as the 
result of a  planned and deliberate political effort. Politicians are, however, everywhere 
present with their fingers regulating infrastructure investment, so there is considerable risk 
that a slow and noisy political process will delay the successful economic development of the 
region, which very easily becomes synonymous with blocking the development
9. Part of the 
solution, of course, lies in a continued process of outsourcing simple manufacturing 
production to other parts of the country and abroad. Hence, attempts to stimulate  short -term 
employment in simple production will be counterproductive. Furthermore, during the current 
recessionary situation with large firms in trouble, the risk for major resource misallocations  
is large. The financial services industry is not only normally a less than competent evaluator 
of radically new industrial prospects. During a period of recession myopia  rules, i.e. long 
term winners run the risk of being lost or sold out cheap.( Here the Swedish system of dual 
shares in many large companies that also serve as holding companies plays a special role. The 
dual shares protect the companies from being raided during a recession when share prices are 
unreasonably low. On the other hand this is no blessing for the company if the  dominant 
stockowners and management are incompetent or without money. The raider should then be 
capable of doing a better job. But if the raider can purchase the company at a price way below 
its long-term value, he does not need much competence to make money on the purchase. 
Realistic long-term stock market values would prevent sloppy take - overs of industrially 
incompetent raiders. Therefore, a stock market populated by industrially incompetent analysts 
who are incapable of estimating the right value of sophisticated companies is a negative social 
asset in a country. The risk for such misestimates and cheap takeovers with consequent 
inefficient production solutions is enhanced during periods of recession or economic crisis. 
Therefore, a broad based supply of long-term investors has been made a necessary part of the 
competence bloc ( under items 4 and 5).)  
 
                                                 
9 A similar situation is blocking the economic development of the Öresund economic region. Political 
unwillingness to standardize and simplify the legal rule system on both sides of the Öresund is making it 
difficult or impossible to enjoy the allocational benefits of the new bridge.   21
The bad scenario would be if all these negative circumstances combine to hold back new 
investment in sophisticated industries in the Lake Mälar region while the policy makers throw 
regional cash incentives  to raise FDIs in less sophisticated  industries outside the Lake Mälar 
region, thus conserving the old structures  that a successfully transforming economy should 
get rid of. 
 
5..The Bavaria /Baden- Württemberg Region 
 
Germany is a very decentralized economy and much larger than Sweden.  The region in 
Germany noted for entrepreneurship and industrial excellence, and therefore singled out for 
comparison is Bavaria/Baden- Württemberg (B/B-W). This region is much larger than the 
Lake Mälar region with a population of  some 21 million people to compare with 2½ around 
the Lake Mälar. It is also geographically larger, but a far better transportation system (trains 
and motorways) makes it almost possible to commute daily from a central position throughout 
the whole region.The industrial competence base is similar, with the distinction that  the Lake 
Mälar region may have an advantage in its innovative financial services competence bloc. 
The industrial composition of the two regions is similar with a strong presence of C&C-, 
biotech/pharmaceutical/health care- and engineering firms, with global players in each sub 
industry. Even though Frankfurt am Main  (outside B/B-W) is the financial centre of 
Germany the B/B-W region has some formidable financial services players, including the 
world´s largest reinsurer, Munich Re. And Munich is counted as the venture capital centre of 
Germany ( Gill-Minshall-Rigby 2003). In addition to that  (Saperstein-Rouach 2002) Bavaria 
is Germany´s most important media location and the second most important book publishing 
location in the world after New York. 
 
While Baden-Württemberg , being an area without own natural resources and with land not 
suitable for agriculture, developed an early industrial tradition , Bavaria was  still an 
agricultural economy some 40 years ago when the CDU under Franz Joseph Strauss decided  
to transform Munich and Bavaria into Germany´s high-tech area. This was achieved through  
creating an industry friendly political environment with a remarkable political stability and 
predictability and a region with many excellent technical universitites. In addition the 
headquarters of both the Max Planck Institute and of the Frauenhofer Gesellschaft are located 
in Munich. Convincing Siemens to move its CHQ from Berlin to Munich was probably an 
instance of successful local industrial policy making. The only negative observation made in 
some interviews was that some decisions of importance, for instance on the transport system, 
were still made at the Federal level. While it is easy to document Swedish policy makers as 
negative factors in the late industrial transformation of Sweden, it cannot be concluded that 
the positive political attitude to private industry in the B/B-W economy is the cause of its 
successful industrial development. Many of the industrial policies enacted have come in the 
form of subsidies and protection from competition that we have learnt not to recognize as 
positive circumstances behind successful economic development. A much more careful 
comparison of the interaction between private industry and the policy community in the two 
regional economies than has been possible here, would, therefore, be necessary.  
The B/B-W region is the home of some of the most well known and successful global 
industrial players of Germany. None of them seems to have been through such traumatic 
experiences as the three Swedish companies in the Lake Mälar region. All of the big ones 
mentioned are still independent companies. The German companies have rather been the ones 
taking the initiative when it comes to foreign mergers. The troubled part of the business   22
community is rather the corporate banking industry, most of it located in Frankfurt.   
 
Engineering/Automotive 
On the engineering side the B/B-W region features the by far most sophisticated  automotive 
industry concentration in the world, being known for its well engineered luxury cars. We have 
 
Audi  (CHQ in Ingolstadt. Belongs to VW group) 
BMW (CHQ in Munich) 
Bosch (CHQ in Stuttgart) 
Daimler Chrysler (CHQ in Stuttgart) 
Porsche (CHQ in Stuttgart) 
MAN  (CHQ in Munich) 
 
Bosch  is the core technical component developer and producer of the automotive industry. It 
is known for being innovative, having  invented, for instance , electronic fuel injection and 
ABS brakes. MAN is a large producer of  trucks and heavy machinery . 
 
Heidelberger Druck (CHQ in Heidelberg) 
is the world´s largest developer and maker of printing machines and the large engineering 
firm of the region outside automotive industry.  
 
Computing &Communications 
Epcos    ( CHQ in Munich.A spin off from Siemens. Makes intelligent chips for automotive 
industry) 
Infineon ( CHQ in Munich. A spin off from Siemens. The second largest chips manufacturer 
in Europe) 
SAP       (CHQ in Karlsruhe) 
Siemens (CHQ in Munich, with medical equipment in Erlangen, also in Bavaria) 
 
Siemens and ABB are interesting case stories to compare. Siemens internalises large parts of 
the product ranges of ABB, Electrolux and Ericsson. During the heyday of the New Economy 
euphoria financial analysts were urging Siemens´ management  to be like ABB and get out of 
turbines and other heavy electrical equipment production. But old fashioned Siemens 
management prevailed and instead put more internal pressure on management to perform, 
sold out profitable marginal activities and did not enter on an acquisitions spree, but rather 
pared down debt (Business Week Nov.11.2002.p.21). The German attitude has rather been 
that unwieldly conglomerates may not be that bad.   
Aerospace 
DASA (CHQ in Munich, now part of the European Aerospace and Defense Systems group 
(EADS) with CHQ in Paris ) 
 
Aerospace industry integrates computing and electronics and advanced engineering 
technology. Aerospace industry is already today a user of  future of engineering technology,  
and has therefore  been regarded as a prime industrial asset in industrial policy circles 
(Eliasson 1995 ). Daimler Chrysler was the main owner of DASA which was engaged in 
military as well as civilian aircraft in joint projects with among other  France and the UK 
(Airbus Consortium, Eurofighter). Attempts to create a European aerospace giant to match 
US Boeing for a long time kept  stumbling on national priorities. Also here the technological 
spillovers from aerospace industry will probably benefit the B/B-W industries more than 
other areas of Germany, and even though the Chairman of then Daimler Benz once almost   23
wrecked the company on the mistaken idea of creating a technology giant on the basis of 




Heavy chemical,  industry has a long tradition and a strong presence in Germany. The big 
chemical companies were radically reorganized after the WWII. Most of the large chemical 
companies have entered the pharmaceutical and (later) the biotech markets.They have a more 
than proportional presence in the B/B-W region. The big players are: 
 
Altana with CHQ in Konstanz 
BASF (CHQ in Ludwigshafen) 




The German financial and insurance services industry  is in the midst of a grand restructuring 
to become competitive  internationally and efficient internally (Business Week, March 20. 
2000). We have: 
Deutsche Bank (CHQ in Frankfurt, with a large branch office in Stuttgart) 
Allianz (CHQ in Munich)
10 
Bayerische Hypovereinsbank (HVB, Germany´s second largest  bank) 
Bayerische Landesbank (CHQ in Munich) 
MLP (CHQ in Mannheim) 
Munich Re (CHQ in Munich. The world´s largest reinsurer) 
 
While the big banks and insurance companies, notably in Frankfurt are in various stages of 
trouble, the venture capital industry lives a separate life in Munich. Both the German and the 
Swedish financial services industries lack globally excellent players and none are competitive 






I have made the industrial competence embodied in the financial services industry central to 
my transformation analysis of two advanced  industrial regions. Both regions have a strong 
industrial presence in the technologies considered to be  critical for the New Economy, 
notably C&C  and biotechnology, but also in the  health  industry . Both regions are, 
therefore, considered  central for the developemnt of the entire national economy as pioneer 
entrants into the New type of Economy that is opened up by new technology.The local 
venture capital competence that will be instrumental in facilitating the transition to a New 
Economy has been found not to be outstanding in any of the two regions. 
Both regions can exhibit an impressive display of global industrial players. When adjusted for 
size of the region, however, the Lake Mälar takes the lead, but this lead also mirrors the 
problem of the region, namely its dependence on a small number of  large international firms, 
exposed to intense global competition. 
                                                 
10 Allianz has acquired  troubled Dresdner Bank , which owns  London´s Kleinworth Benson that specializes in 
high-tech IPOs   24
The industrial resources shake out has also been less pronounced in the BV/B-W region than 
in the Lake Mälar region, the latter being more dependent on  a small number of big and 
aging companies and the existence of  complete competence blocs to pick up spilled resources 
of radically new technology locally. 
 
Some obvious differences between Germany and Sweden should be noted. Within each 
industry  B/B-W exhibits  much more diversity than the corresponding Lake Mälar industries 
A larger part of the German industrial technology base, furthermore , exists within unified 
management hierarchies. Thus, for instance, Siemens  internalizes  activities  that in Sweden 
are distributed over ABB, Electrolux and Ericsson. This means that the capacity to locally 
reinvest locally released technologies must be larger in the B/B-W region  than in the Lake 
Mälar region., provided  the released technologies are not radically different from those  
already employed  by firms in the region. This reflects the conservative organization of 
German firms. 
 
Several big B/B-W companies have been through a period of crisis, but not as extreme as that 
of Ericsson and ABB, partly because the Swedish firms are more specialized and, hence, 
more exposed. The problem firms, furthermore, account for a smaller share of total resources 
invested. The reallocation of resources in the Lake Mälar region has been more profound and 
more dependent on the not so outstanding venture capital industry.  
The large German firms in the B/B-W region, furthermore, appear to have been better at 
internal restructuring than the corresponding large firms in the Lake Mälar region. The entire  
automotive industry is an outstanding example despite the fact that Scania has been very 
sucessful as well, and perhaps more successful than the DaimlerChrysler truck division. 
Siemens´ development compares very well with both ABB and Ericsson, despite early 
predictions to the contrary (Business Week Nov. 11.2002.p.21). 
 
In most respects , and notably in the transport area the infrastructure serving manufacturing 
production is better in Germany than in Sweden. While the B/B-W  politicians have made it 
their task for decades to create a positive local climate for industry and entrepreneurship,  
Swedish politicians have had great difficulties even to openly recognize the individual talent 
engaged in private production as the source of Swedish industrial wealth. In conclusion then, 
the Lake Mälar economy  is in a  more precarious situation attempting   to transform itself  
over the market  into a  new economy than the B/B-W region . Local politicians have to rush 
and they are  dependent on a change in national  policies that will mean a change in the post 
WWII  political tradition.  It is, therefore, easy for the Lake Mälar region to miss the boat to 




Capital markets are segmented. Part of the reason should be looked for in the nature of legal 
institutions. In segmented markets big MNCs have a financing advantage in that they  can 
pool resources internally.  The competence to allocate these pooled resources on investments 
is , however, quite another thing and is likely to be conservative and biased towards the 
inhouse competence of the MNF. 
 
As soon as radically new projects are to be funded industrially ” the competent” venture 
capitalists of a complete and horisontally varied competence bloc are needed. The supply of 
such venture capital competence is, however, extremely scarce outside the US. The financial 
situation of regional economies in transition in Europe thus has two critical distinguishing   25
dimensions: 
1.  Identification of winning projects requires sophisticated local venture capital competence 
2.  For regional growth to occur volume funding is needed when winners have been identified. 
 
IPO  funding of winners for rapid global expansion  requires access to volume finance in 
global markets, notably global stock markets. Global integration of stock markets will mean 
access to large volumes of finance for local investments, but also an increased risk of large 
volumes of local saving being pulled out of the local economy since local investment 
opportunities are either  lacking or not discovered by (incompetent) venture capitalists. 
 
Venture capital funding, on the other hand, requires the local presence of venture capitalists, 
or vice versa, that the firm moves  to the venture capital market. Since the CHQ is normally in 
charge of the financing window CHQs tend to be located in sophisticated financial markets. 
This is particularly the case for small firms in radically new technologies. The winning firm 
normally has to change management when changing from the entrepreneurial  phase to 
industrial scale production ( in the competence bloc). For this change the CHQ organization 
plays an important role (Eliasson 2004, Ch.5). Similarly , a different financial competence 
clicks in when the winner goes industrial. Lacking sophisticated  financial markets , the 
industrial banking systems of Germany and (also) Sweden have difficulties accomodating that 
transition since  the banks do not have the entire  range of competencies inhouse and since the  
smooth intermediation  over markets is not functional. German banks , therefore, have been  
trying- but not very successfully- to remedy that situation through mergers and (notably 
Deutsche Bank in Frankfurt) through acquisitions in London to establish a global window. 
 
The policy competition race defined 
Summing up so far we observe that the industrial economies at large and some (previously) 
advanced regional economies  in particular are experiencing dramatic change. The industrial 
economies at large, and their advanced regions in particular are being subjected to new 
technological competition on an order of magnitude not experienced  before. In addition, the 
industrial world is still (April 2004) on its way out of a severe recession with many large and 
small firms in crisis and  a broad variety of sophisticated resources being shaken loose in the 
markets. Opportunities are abundant  but so are also the risks of transformation failure. We 
can conclude (first) that the large international firms – the typical industrial competence 
characteristic of Swedish industry – are experiencing serious problems en masse and for the 
first time. This (second) however, was a conclusion already drawn from our theoretical 
analysis and should be no surprise. This makes it all the more important that the policy maker 
understands the third fact, namely that there are better alternative allocations of the resources 
released in the market than locking them into the big firms, but that they won’t be realized 
unless policies vis-à-vis new entrepreneurs and small firms are radically changed. We have 
also concluded that most resources released from contracting firms in the Lake Mälar region 
are too sophisticated to be reinvested elsewhere in Sweden. The alternative allocation will be 
a loss, or  abroad. Consequently, local new firm establishment  will have to pick up the 
released resources and determine success of the transformation of the four industries in the 
Lake Mälar region. 
 
For the Lake Mälar region  to capture the technological spillovers from reorganizing and/or 
contracting large and sophisticated companies before they disappear elsewhere the local 
regional investment  attractor must  be capable of performing five tasks with excellence, i.e. 
to 
-identify winners in the flow of resources   26
-prevent the winners from getting lost or 
-being acquired by foreign investors and moved out of the region 
-attract foreign  investors to introduce complementary and sophisticated technologies in the 
region that add to the local competence bloc or attractor. 
The special situation for the Lake Mälar region is that the race is already on globally and that 
immediate action is called for to shore up the outflow of sophisticated technology. 
Furthermore, the potential for capturing local spillovers for local reinvestment is greater than 
for attracting  FDIs from global markets. The back side of this is that the less attractive the 
local region for such local reinvestments the more attractive local technology spillovers will 
be for foreign investors. As long as the attraction is locally locked in resources, such as high 
quality workers, the investment will stay locally. But if the attraction is easily moved 
technology, the probability is high that it will be moved out. 
Fast policy action is thus needed in the Lake Mälar region, to capture local spillovers before 
they are reallocated outside the region, and  outside Sweden, i e to prevent the boat to the 
New Economy from leaving without local passengers. 
 
In some ways the problems are  similar  to those of a formerly planned economy, which 
 needs to permanently attract both technology and management competence to exploit cheap 
labor. The Lake Mälar region needs to attract  entrepreneurial talent and venture capital 
competence to convert radically new local technology into industry and to exploit cheap 
engineers  who will remain cheap until reindustrialization gets going. For this to happen 
incentives have to be generous and right. Even though the local political situation for that 
does not look promising, the politicians should at least recall that  Sweden has a long and 
successful tradition to fall back on. Some 200 years ago Sweden was a pioneer in attracting 
global industrial talent through immigration, notably from middle Europe and from England 
by extending generous privilegies. Without that immigration the rapid and successful 
industrialization of Sweden (See Figure) would not have been possible. 
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Table  1.  The four mechanisms of Schumpeterian creative destruction and economic 
growth 
1. Innovative  entry 
  enforces (through competition) 
2     Reorganization 
3. Rationalization  or 
4.  Exit (shut down)   31
Source: Eliasson,Gunnar,1993, ”Företagens, institutionernas och marknadernas roll i Sverige”, Appendix 6 in A. 
Lindbeck (ed.), Nya villkor för ekonomi och politik (SOU 1993:16) and G. Eliasson (1996). Firm Objectives, 
Controls and Organization – the use of information and the transfer of knowledge within the firm. 
Boston/Dordrecht/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, p. 45. 
 
Table 2A.  The dominant selection problem 
Error Type I:   Losers kept too long 
Error Type II:  Winners lost 









Table 2B.  Actors in the competence bloc 
1.  Competent and active customers 
2.  Innovators who integrate technologies in new ways 
3.  Entrepreneurs who identify profitable innovations 
4.  Competent venture capitalists who recognize and finance the entrepreneurs   
5.  Exit markets that facilitate ownership change 
6.  Industrialists who take successful innovations to industrial scale production  
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and later updatings.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 